EVIDENCE-DRUNKEN DRIVING-NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT
SENDS A SOBERING SIGNAL TO DRUNKEN DRIVERs-State v. Tis-

chio, 107 NJ. 504, 527 A.2d 388 (1987).
Traditionally, political and social movements have encountered resistance from groups championing opposing viewpoints.I
Such resistance, however, has been notably absent from the current offensive aimed at freeing the roads of the deadly mix of
alcohol and automobiles.2 Consequently, efforts to crackdown
on drunken driving have travelled a path free from the opposition which ordinarily slows action and ignites debate. Illustratively, the New Jersey courts and Legislature have narrowed the
1 See, e.g., E. LARSON, TRIAL AND ERROR, THE AMERICAN CONTROVERSY OVER
CREATION AND EVOLUTION 3 (1985) (describing the "popular crusade" against instruction of the theory of evolution); M. WILLEBRANDT, THE INSIDE OF PROHIBITION

(1929) (noting that "[n]o political, economic or moral issue has so engrossed and
divided all the people of America as the prohibition problem, except the issue of
slavery"); Lipset, Roosevelt and The Protest of the 1930s, 68 MINN. L. REV. 273, 274
(1983) (indicating that President Roosevelt, in proposing New Deal legislation
"faced protest and anti-capitalist sentiment that threatened to undermine the existing political system and create new political parties"); Rhode, Perspectives on Professional Women, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1163, 1196-97 (1988) (observing opposition to
affirmative action programs); Note, Political Protest and the Illinois Defense of Necessity,
54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1070-71 (1987) (describing the successful use of the defense of
necessity in the anti-apartheid movement); Butterfield, Anatomy of The Nuclear Protest,
N.Y. Times, July 11, 1982 (Magazine), at 6 (describing the nuclear protest movement as "an extraordinary grass-roots nationwide movement to stop the nuclear
arms race"). See also Forwardto Opposition and Political Change, 40 J. INT'L AFF. 219
(1987). The author stated:
[I]t seems impossible that opposition could ever not exist; there will always be people who are not content with the status quo, who feel that
things could and should be better, and who set about to make such
changes.... [O]pposition can take many forms . .. all of these are expressions of dissatisfaction with the policies of incumbent governments,
actions taken by opponents of the ruling regime intent on effecting
some type of political change or reform in their countries ....
Id. at vii (emphasis in original).
2 See Note, Social Host Held Liable for Serving Liquor to Intoxicated Guest Who Causes
Auto Accident Injuring Third Party, 15 SETON HALL L. REv. 616, 631 (1985) (authored
by James B. Clark III) (noting that eliminating drunken driving is "an almost universally accepted goal of modem society"). See also Comment, The Bumper Sticker:
The Innovation That Failed, 22 NEw ENG. L. REV. 643 (1987). The article states:
As society became aware of the seriousness of the drunken driving
problem in the United States, public interest and community groups
sprang up across the nation. These groups demanded that something
be done to lessen the severity of the drunken-driving problem. They
campaigned for legislative reform, and stricter enforcement of the ex-

isting drunken driving laws.
Id. at 643 (footnotes omitted).
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defenses available to one accused of drunken driving.3 Most recently the New Jersey Supreme Court in State v. Tischio4 established New Jersey as the first state refusing to recognize the
probative value of extrapolation evidence in drunken-driving
/
cases. 5
On the evening of April 11, 1984, the Metuchen police
stopped John Tischio after they allegedly witnessed him driving
erratically. 6 Upon approaching the vehicle, an officer detected
alcohol on Tischio's breath and observed him staggering.' As a
result, Tischio was arrested for driving his automobile while
under the influence of alcohol.' At police headquarters, Tischio
was administered two breathalyzer tests.' The result of both
tests was a blood alcohol reading of 0.1 1%.ol The first of these
two tests was not administered until approximately one hour after Tischio's initial stop.'"
After the close of the prosecution's case in the Metuchen
3 Compare N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:4-50.1 (West Supp. 1988) (operating a vehicle
with 0.10% blood alcohol content is a per se offense) with N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:450(a) (West 1954) (breathalyzer reading of 0.15% creates a presumption of intoxication). See also Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538, 476 A.2d 1219 (1984) (holding a
social host liable for injury inflicted by a driver to whom he or she provided alcohol); Romano v. Kimmelman, 96 N.J. 66, 474 A.2d 1 (1984) (finding particular
breathalyzer models to be reliable despite their susceptibility to radio frequencies);
State v. Sweeney, 40 N.J. 359, 192 A.2d 573 (1963) (holding that movement of a
vehicle is not required to convict a defendant of operating a motor vehicle).
4 107 N.J. 504, 527 A.2d 388 (1987), appeal dismissed, 108 S. Ct. 768 (1988).
5 Id. at 522, 527 A.2d at 397. Extrapolation is the "process of estimating an
unknown number outside the range of known numbers." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY
528 (5th ed. 1979). Often in drunken-driving cases, test results taken after a great
delay do not accurately reveal the blood alcohol level at the time of driving. Note,
State v. Tischio: Drunk Driving and Due Process Don't Mix, 40 RUTGERs L. REV. 611
(1988). Thus, extrapolation evidence is used to relate the test results back to the
time of driving. See id. Prior to Tischio, this was the defense strategy used in 90% of
drunken-driving cases. Cheever & Bird, Court Takes Tough View on Breath Test Results,
120 N.J.L.J. 3 (1987).
6 Tischio, 107 N.J. at 506-07, 527 A.2d at 389.
7 Id. at 507, 527 A.2d at 389. Upon arrest, Tischio admitted to drinking three
or four beers prior to driving his automobile. Id.
8 Id. Tischio was arrested pursuant to N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:4-50(a) (West Supp.
1985). Tischio, 107 N.J. at 507, 527 A.2d at 389. The statute provides that "[a]
person who operates a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, narcotic, hallucinogenic or habit-producing drug... shall be subject [to penalties listed]." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:4-50(a) (West Supp. 1984).
9 Tischio, 107 N.J. at 507, 527 A.2d at 389.
10 Id. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:4-50(a) (West Supp. 1985). That section sanctions "[a] person who ... operates a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.10% or more by weight of alcohol in the defendant's blood." Id.
II Tischio, 107 N.J. at 507, 527 A.2d at 389. The second test was administered
approximately one and one-quarter hours after the initial stop. Id.
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Municipal Court, the defendant moved for acquittal. 12 Tischio
maintained that the state failed to establish that at the time he
was driving, his blood alcohol level exceeded the legally permissible limit.' 3 Upon the denial of this motion, the defendant intro-

duced expert testimony asserting that the result of the
breathalyzer did not accurately reflect his blood alcohol concentration at the time of driving. 14 The expert maintained that a
0.11 % reading indicated that one hour earlier, while operating
his vehicle, Tischio's blood alcohol level was 0.07%."
Despite this evidence, the municipal court found Tischio
guilty of driving with a blood alcohol level in excess of 0.10%.16
The New Jersey Superior Court, Law Division, reached the same
conclusion in a trial de novo. 17 On appeal, the defendant maintained that the state failed to establish an impermissible blood
alcohol concentration at the time of actual operation.' 8 The appellate division disagreed with the defendant's contentions holding that N.J. Stat. Ann. § 39:4-50(a) required a breathalyzer
reading of at least 0.10% at any time after driving, so long as no
additional alcohol was ingested prior to testing, to warrant conviction.' 9 In arriving at this conclusion, the appellate court explained that the defendant's position would allow those who
consume alcohol and inevitably reach the prohibited blood alcohol count to "sit as moving time bombs which could not be disarmed because the offending alcohol has not yet been sufficiently
concentrated in the blood."' 20 Consequently, the appellate division deemed the offered extrapolation evidence irrelevant and affirmed Tischio's conviction. 2 ' The New Jersey Supreme Court
22
granted certification.
In upholding the conviction, the state supreme court reasoned that when construing statutes that are "not unambiguous," the court must attempt to effectuate the legislative intent of
Id.
Id. The state's evidence consisted of testimony of one of the officers and the
results of both breathalyzer tests. Id.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Id. at 507-08, 527 A.2d at 389.
18 See State v. Tischio, 208 N.J. Super. 343, 346-47, 506 A.2d 14, 15 (App. Div.
1986), aff'd, 107 N.J. 504, 527 A.2d 388 (1987), appeal dismissed, 108 S. Ct. 768
(1988).
19 Id. at 347, 506 A.2d at 16 (emphasis added).
20 Id.
21 See id. at 347, 506 A.2d at 16.
22 105 N.J. 518, 523 A.2d 163 (1986).
12
13
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the statute. 3 Consistent with the legislative intent underlying
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 39:4-50(a), the court held that a drunken-driving offense may be demonstrated solely by the result of a
breathalyzer test administered within a reasonable time after the
defendant is stopped. 24 As a result, extrapolation evidence offered to demonstrate a defendant's blood alcohol level while
driving is neither required nor allowed.25
It was not until the 1930s that drunken driving laws began
their development. 26 Early consideration of the offense in New
Jersey found courts grappling with labeling the intoxicated driver
a disorderly person or a public nuisance.27 In State v. Rodgers,
perhaps the earliest drunken-driving case in this country,2 8 the
defendant drove his automobile down a street and through a saloon window while intoxicated. 29 The court determined that the
defendant was guilty of a disorderly person's offense and sentenced him to thirty days in jail.30
Since the Rodgers decision, drunken-driving laws have
changed considerably. In efforts to rid New Jersey highways of
3
the often lethal effects which result from drinking and driving, '
23 See Tischio, 107 N.J. at 510, 527 A.2d at 390-91 (citing Perez v. Pantasote, Inc.,
95 NJ. 105, 114, 469 A.2d 22, 27 (1984)).
24 Id. at 522, 527 A.2d at 397.
25 Id.
26 See Kirsch, Too Drunk to Walk: Legislative Overview, 105 N.J. LAw. 22 (Nov.
1983). Most were enacted after the repeal of prohibition in 1933. Id.
27 See, e.g., State v. Rodgers, 90 N.J.L. 60, 99 A. 931 (Sup. Ct. 1917), rev'd, 91
N.J.L. 212, 102 A. 433 (N.J. 1917).
28 See Kirsch, supra note 26, at 22. See also State v. Rodgers, 90 N.J.L. 60, 99 A.
931 (Sup. Ct. 1917), rev'd, 91 N.J.L. 212, 102 A. 433 (N.J. 1917).
29 Rodgers, 90 NJ.L. at 61-62, 99 A. at 932.
30 Rodgers, 91 N.J.L. at 213, 218, 102 A. at 434, 436.
31 The statistics compiled by the New Jersey Office of Highway Safety Statistics
reflect the following:
MOTOR VEHICLE FATAL ACCIDENTS
1986
Total
Total
Total
Drunken
Killed
Percent
Fatal
Total
Drunken
Drivers
by
Killed
County
Accid.
Killed
Drivers
Killed
DD
by DD
Atlantic
67
70
16
10
16
23%
Bergen
67
74
10
6
12
16%
Burlington
75
87
9
8
10
11%
Camden
77
83
12
7
16
19%
Cape May
19
22
6
3
8
36%
Cumberland
33
36
7
5
9
25%
Essex
78
84
8
5
10
12%
Gloucester
31
38
8
6
9
24%
Hudson
39
44
4*
2
7
16%
Hunterdon
17
18
1
1
1
6%
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the courts and legislature have traversed a continued course of
tougher laws3 2 and frequent arrests.3 3 One advancement in this
Mercer
Middlesex
Monmouth
Morris
Ocean
Passaic
Salem
Somerset
Sussex
Union
Warren
TOTAL

37
70
60
45
58
34
23
35
21
39
21
946

39
81
63
47
61
40
28
38
22
42
22
1039

10
18*
13
11
10
10
3
9*
6
9
4*
184

8
15
7
8
6
8
2
4
4
5
3
123

11
19
13
11
11
14
3
8
6
10
3
207

28%
23%
21%
23%.
18%.
35%6
11%o
21%.
27%
24%.
14%6
207

1987
Total
Total
Total
Drunken
Killed
Percent
Fatal
Total
Drunken
Drivers
by
Killed
County
Accid.
Killed
Drivers
Killed
DD
by DD
Atlantic
66
75
15
10
17
23%
Bergen
85
88
16
7
17
19%
Burlington
54
59
12
8
13
22%
Camden
60
73
6
5
6
8%
Cape May
24
26
11*
6
11
42%
Cumberland
32
37
8
3
10
27%
Essex
73
83
15
12
21
25%
Gloucester
35
42
8
8
10
24%
Hudson
33
35
6*
4
6
17%
Hunterdon
13
17
3
3
3
18%
Mercer
32
35
8
5
8
23%
Middlesex
80
90
18
12
20
22%
Monmouth
58
66
13
9
15
23%
Morris
54
52
15*
11
14
27%
Ocean
49
56
11
8
11
20%
Passaic
39
41
9
5
10
24%
Salem
23
25
7
5
7
28%
Somerset
23
23
7
6
7
30%
Sussex
24
25
7
5
7
28%
Union
48
50
13
11
14
28%
Warren
21
25
7
6
7
28%
TOTAL
929
1023
215
149
234
23%
Note: Drunken drivers involved in a fatal accident with A.B.A.C. of 0.10% or
higher only
Source: F.A.R.S. and S.P.F.A.I. Unit.
* Indicates that two (2) drunken drivers were involved in one (1) accident. To
obtain the number of fatal accidents by drunken drivers, subtract the asterisk (*)
from the total drunken drivers column. These figures represent death by motor
vehicle within thirty (30) days.
32 Compare N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:4-50.1 (West 1973) (declaring a blood alcohol
concentration of 0.15% to create presumption of intoxication) with N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 39:4-50(a) (West Supp. 1988) (declaring a blood alcohol concentration of 0.10%
a per se offense).
33 The following DWI arrests were made in New Jersey between 1978 and 1987:
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area is the introduction of chemical analysis to determine levels
of intoxication. 34 The use of such analysis is based upon a recognition that every person is adversely affected by the consumption
of certain amounts of alcohol. 35 This contention was recognized
3 7
by early courts3

6

and subsequently adopted by the legislature.

34 See Romano v. Kimmelman, 96 N.J. 66, 474 A.2d 1 (1984). The Romano court
described the breathalyzer's use of chemical analysis to determine blood alcohol
content:
The instrument is essentially a light balancing device. It contains a light
source positioned between two photoelectric cells. Each cell is connected electronically to opposite sides of a current reading meter.
When the light is turned on, electric energy is produced by the photoelectric cells which causes a current to flow into the meter. The meter
needle will deflect from center one way or the other depending on
which current is stronger. The light between the photoelectric cells can
be mechanically moved by means of an adjusting knob geared to a finely
threaded shaft closer to one cell or to the other. Because photoelectric
energy produced by each of the cells varies with the distance from the
light, the light can be moved so that the current strength produced by
each is equal and opposite. The meter needle is centered indicating
zero current flow through it. Between the light and each of the cells is a
receptacle for an ampule-a sealed glass container with a solution of
potassium dichromate and sulphuric acid. The light thus passes
through each of the ampules before striking the photoelectric cell. The
solution is a lemon yellow in color. With solutions of the same color the
meter needle registers zero current. To conduct a test the seal on one
of the ampules is broken and the breath sample is bubbled through that
solution. Any alcohol in the breath reacts with the potassium dichromate and effectively fades or lightens the color of the solution. The
more alcohol in the breath-the lighter the solution becomes. More
light from the source is allowed to strike the photoelectric cell on that
side than before; more photoelectric energy is produced; more current
results and the meter needle then moves-proportionately to the
amount of alcohol in the breath. The source light can then be shifted by
use of the threaded screw away from the test ampule and toward the
reference ampule. In this fashion the amount of light striking each photoelectric cell can be equalized and the meter needle again brought to
zero reading. The distance traveled by the source light on the threaded
screw is thus a measure of the alcohol in the breath. By mechanical calibration this distance is read off on a separate scale as a percent of alcohol in the breath.
Id. at 79-80, 474 A.2d at 8.
35 See State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 165, 199 A.2d 809, 819 (1964).
36 See, e.g., State v. Hunter, 4 N.J. Super. 531, 68 A.2d 274 (App. Div. 1949),
aff'd, 12 N.J. Super. 128, 79 A.2d 80 (App. Div. 1951). In Hunter, then-Judge Brennan stated, "[s]ettled medical opinion apparently is that any person is unfit to drive
when his blood alcohol concentration is at or in excess of fifteen-hundredths of one
per cent." Hunter, 4 N.J. Super. at 534, 68 A.2d at 275.
37 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:4-50.1 (West 1973). The statute stated that in "any
prosecution ... relating to driving a vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor" a blood alcohol concentration of 0.15% or above creates a presumption
of intoxication. Id.
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In 1951, the state legislature introduced a statutory presumption
of intoxication upon a finding of a blood alcohol level of
0.15%.38
New Jersey courts considered and ultimately dismissed early
challenges to the statute's validity. 3 9 In State v. Protokowicz,40 the
defendant's blood sample revealed a blood alcohol count in excess of 0.15%, triggering the statutory presumption of intoxication pursuant to N.J. Stat. Ann. § 39:4-50.1. 11 Accordingly, he
was convicted of operating a vehicle while intoxicated in violation
of New Jersey law. 4 2
On appeal, the defendant attacked both statutes contending
that, when combined, they created a constitutionally prohibited
irrebuttable presumption of guilt. 4 3 In rejecting the defendant's
assertion, the court acknowledged that one purpose of N.J. Stat.
Ann. § 39:4-50.1 was to alleviate the need for expert testimony.4 4
The court noted, however, that the statute did not preclude evidence offered to rebut the presumption of intoxication.4 5
It was not until 1964 that the Supreme Court of New Jersey
addressed the statute's validity. 46 In State v. Johnson,47 the defendant was stopped by police 500 feet from where she had been
parked. 48 After witnessing her erratic behavior and detecting the
odor of alcohol, the police administered a drunkometer test
which revealed a blood alcohol reading of 0.18%. 4 1 Consequently, Johnson was found guilty of violating N.J. Stat. Ann.
38 Act of April 5, 1951, ch. 24, § 30 1951 N.J. Laws 76 (current version at N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 39:4-50.1 (West Supp. 1988)).
39 See, e.g., State v. Protokowicz, 55 N.J. Super. 598, 151 A.2d 396 (App. Div.
1959).
40 55 N.J. Super. 598, 151 A.2d 396 (App. Div. 1959).
41 See id. at 600, 151 A.2d at 398.

42 Id., 151 A.2d at 397.
43 Id. at 600-01, 151 A.2d at 398. NJ. STAT. ANN. § 39:4-50.1 (West 1954) provided that "[i]f there was at that time 0.15 per centum or more by weight of alcohol
in the defendant's blood, it shall be presumed that the defendant was under the
influence of intoxicating liquor." Id. Cf N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:1-13 (West 1982).

The statute declares that "[n]o person may be convicted of an offense unless each
element of such offense is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In the absence of
such proof, the innocence of the defendant is assumed." Id.
44 See Protokowicz, 55 N.J. Super. at 602, 151 A.2d at 399.
45 Id.

46 State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 199 A.2d 809 (1964).
47 42 N.J. 146, 199 A.2d 809 (1964).
48 Id. at 152-53, 199 A.2d at 812.
49 Id. at 153, 199 A.2d at 813. The defendant had difficulty getting out of her
car, fumbled with her license, and staggered when she walked. Id.

1989]

NOTE

255

§ 39:4-50.5°

Upholding the defendant's conviction, 5 ' the supreme court
stated that the drunkometer was an accurate device for measuring levels of intoxication, and therefore, its results were admissible in establishing such intoxication.52 While recognizing the
strength of this presumption,
the court specifically held that it
53
was not conclusive.

In 1984, the New Jersey Supreme Court in Romano v. Kimmelman 5 4 examined the reliability of breathalyzer results.5 5 Based
primarily on the results of Smith and Wesson Breathalyzer tests,
the plaintiffs in Romano were each charged with driving while intoxicated.56 Seeking an injunction against the use of such results,
the plaintiffs based their positions upon an unreported municipal
court determination that the breathalyzer results were unreliable
because of the Smith and Wesson models' susceptibility to radio
frequencies. 57 Following the appellate division's denial of the
sought relief, the supreme court granted certification
to address
58
only the issues of reliability and admissibility.
In its decision, the supreme court noted that scientific acceptance and validity did not mandate unanimous agreement as
to the value of the technique. 59 Rather, the court determined
that a "sufficient scientific basis to produce uniform and reason50 Id. at 151, 199 A.2d at 811. The defendant was found guilty of operating a
vehicle while intoxicated based upon the results of chemical analysis. See id.
51 See id. at 176, 199 A.2d at 826.
52 Id. at 170-71, 199 A.2d at 822-23 (quoting State v. Miller, 64 N.J. Super. 262,
268, 165 A.2d 829, 832 (App. Div. 1960)).
53 Id. at 173, 199 A.2d at 824. The presumption was not held to conclusively
sustain the state's burden of proof or to eliminate the right to rebut that case. Id.
54 96 N.J. 66, 474 A.2d 1 (1984).
55 Moore, McDermott & Moore, Validity of the Breathalyzer, 105 N.J. Law. 31, 31
(Nov. 1983). The breathalyzer has been deemed an accurate devise for determining blood alcohol levels. Id. It is the most frequently used method for doing so in
this state. Id. In charges of a violation of N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:4-50.1, the introduction into evidence of a blood alcohol reading of 0.10% is conclusive evidence of
operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated. Id. Smith and Wesson Breathalyzers
(models 900 and 900A) were approved for making such determinations by the attorney general. Id.
56 Romano, 96 N.J. at 74, 474 A.2d at 5.
57 Id. At issue in the municipal court's decision was a charge that radio interference effected the performance of the Smith and Wesson Breathalyzers. Id. (citing
State v. Lopat, (Mun. Ct., April 6, 1983)). In the Lopat decision, the court declared
that breathalyzers are unreliable and the evidence procured through them inadmissible. Id. at 74-76, 474 A.2d at 5-6.
58 Id. at 76, 474 A.2d at 6.
59 Id. at 80, 474 A.2d at 9.
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ably reliable results" was required. 6 ' Thus, the court declared
that the Smith and Wesson model breathalyzers were sufficiently
reliable to determine blood alcohol levels. 6 '
The impact of the Romano decisionis amplified when viewed
together with the legislative amendments to the 1951 statute. In
1977, the legislature amended N.J. Stat. Ann. § 39:4-50.1 by reducing the blood alcohol level necessary to prompt the statutory
presumption of intoxication.62 The presumption after that date
arose upon a breathalyzer reading of 0.10%. 6 3 More notably, in

1984 the legislature replaced the presumptory language with an
absolute ban on operating a vehicle with a blood alcohol level of
at least 0.10%, making such operation a per se offense. 64 Thus,
the breathalyzer became the "linchpin" of New Jersey drunkendriving law. 65
As a result of the newly amended statute, the relevant inquiry shifted from a determination of intoxication to a finding of
blood alcohol content.66 The creation of a new offense sparked
constitutional challenges to the statute's validity.6 7 One such
challenge was drawn in State v. D'Agostino.68

In D'Agostino, the police stopped the defendant after they
witnessed his car swerving. 69 The results of two breathalyzer
tests revealed blood alcohol readings of 0.18% and 0.19%.70 Af-

ter being convicted of violating the state's drunken-driving statute, the defendant attacked the constitutionality of the
legislation, contending that the statute was void for vagueness
60 Id., 474 A.2d at 8 (quoting State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 536, 432 A.2d 86, 91
(1981)).
61 Id. at 82, 474 A.2d at 9.
62 Act of February 4, 1977, ch. 29, 1977 N.J. Laws 102-03 (current version at
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:4-50.1 (West Supp. 1988)).
63 Id. at 102.
64 Act ofJanuary 9, 1984, ch. 444, 1983 N.J. Laws 1818-19 (codified at NJ. STAT.
ANN. § 39:4-50.1 (West Supp. 1988)).
65 See State v. Tischio, 107 N.J. 504, 510, 527 A.2d 388, 391 (1987), appeal dismissed, 108 S.Ct. 768 (1988). See also, Note, supra note 5, at 611. The author notes
that "a person may be convicted simply on the basis of a breathalyzer test reading
showing a blood alcohol concentration in the proscribed range." Id.
66 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:4-50(a) (West Supp. 1988). The new statute made
operating a vehicle with the prohibited blood alcohol content an offense in itself
regardless of the individual extent of intoxication. Id.
67 See, e.g., State v. Miller, 220 N.J. Super. 106, 531 A.2d 742 (App. Div. 1985);
State v. O'Connor, 220 N.J. Super. 104, 531 A.2d 741 (App. Div. 1984); State v.
D'Agostino, 203 N.J. Super. 69, 495 A.2d 915 (Law Div. 1984).
68 203 N.J. Super. 69, 495 A.2d 915 (Law Div. 1984).
69 Id. at 71, 495 A.2d at 916-17.
70 Id., 495 A.2d at 917.
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and that no rational basis existed for the assertion that a person
71
with a blood alcohol level of 0.10% was a dangerous driver.
The court refuted both claims. 72 In doing so, the court noted
that the statute provided a clear guideline of the offense 73 and
was rooted in a rational legislative determination that a driver
with the prohibited blood alcohol concentration was a danger to
the roads. 4
In its decision, the D'Agostino majority noted that the plain
language of the statute proscribed the offense of driving with a
blood alcohol level of 0.10%. 75 Noting that the state's new lan-

guage "could hardly be more lucid," the majority made no attempt to separate the blood alcohol level at the time of testing
from the level at the actual time of driving.76 Additionally, the
court stressed that the statute did not free the state from its burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.7 7 Rather, the
majority noted, it will alleviate the necessity for expert testimony
at each trial. 7' The court significantly did not state that it would
dispense altogether with the need for such testimony.79
Addressing the state's burden of proof, the court maintained
that the state was required to prove "beyond a reasonable
doubt" the blood alcohol level of the defendant at the time of
driving.80 The court noted that because a breathalyzer test will
be administered after driving, the problem of extrapolation will always arise in determining the defendant's condition at the time
of operation. 8 ' The court held, however, that in light of the high
breathalyzer readings, there was no doubt as to the defendant's
intoxication. 2
In State v. O'Connor,8 3 the appellate division clarified the statute's meaning in response to another challenge to its constitutionality. 84 Appealing his drunken-driving conviction, O'Connor
argued that the statute imposed a mandatory presumption of in71 Id. at 73-74, 495 A.2d at 917-18.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 See
72
73
74
75
76

at 73-76, 495 A.2d at 917-19.
at 74, 495 A.2d at 918.
at 76, 495 A.2d at 919.
at 71, 495 A.2d at 916.
id. at 72, 77, 495 A.2d at 917, 920.
at 77, 495 A.2d at 920.
id.

80 Id.
81 See id.

82 Id. at 78, 495 A.2d at 920.
83 220 N.J. Super. 104, 531 A.2d 741 (App. Div. 1984).
84 See id. at 105, 531 A.2d at 741.
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toxication in violation of due process. s5 The court declared that
the argument was "stopped short" by the fact that no presumption was created.8 6 Instead, the court maintained that the statute
blatantly prohibited the operation of an automobile by any driver
with a blood alcohol level of 0.10% or more.8 7
Amidst a heightened awareness of the dangers of drunkendriving, early interpretation of the newly enacted statute remained pragmatic. 88 Rich with rhetoric condemning drunken
drivers as "chief instrumentalities of human catastrophe," 89 the
statute's meaning was viewed as plain and unambiguous.9 0 The
judiciary responded by pointing out that the statute was penal in
9
nature, and therefore, construed it strictly. '
In State v. Kreyer,9 2 the defendant appealed his conviction of
93
operating an automobile while under the influence of alcohol.
The defendant urged that although his breathalyzer tests resulted in readings of 0.14% and 0.13%, he was "not under the
influence of [alcohol]" and, consequently, did not violate N.J.
Stat. Ann. § 39:4-50.1 4 The court affirmed the defendant's conviction. 5 Determining that no lack of clarity existed in the statute's wording, the Kreyer majority construed N.J. Stat. Ann.
§ 39:4-50 to "flatly" forbid the operation of an automobile by a
driver with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.10% or more. 6
Operation and intoxication were viewed by courts as two
separate acts which must occur together to constitute the offense. 9 7 In State v. Rypkema,9 8 the police apprehended the defendant one and one-half hours after he was seen fleeing from
Id.
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., State v. Grant, 196 N.J. Super. 470, 483 A.2d 411 (App. Div. 1984)
(upholding drunken-driving conviction against constitutional challenges); State v.
D'Agostino, 203 N.J. Super. 69, 495 A.2d 915 (Law Div. 1984) (statute not void for
vagueness and did not infringe upon defendant's rights).
89 Grant, 196 NJ. Super. at 476, 483 A.2d at 414.
90 See id. at 475-76, 483 A.2d at 414.
91 Id. at 480, 483 A.2d at 417.
92 201 NJ. Super. 202, 492 A.2d 1088 (App. Div. 1985).
93 Id. at 203-04, 492 A.2d at 1088.
94 Id. at 204, 492 A.2d at 1088-89.
95 Id., 492 A.2d at 1089.
85
86
87
88

96 Id.

97 See, e.g.,
State v. Rypkema, 191 N.J. Super. 388, 466 A.2d 1324 (Law Div.
1983). In Ryphema, the court noted that "the act of operating a vehicle must be
contemporaneous with being under the influence." Id. at 393, 466 A.2d at 1326
(citing State v. Prociuk, 145 N.J. Super. 570, 368 A.2d 436 (Law Div. 1976)).
98 191 N.J. Super. 388, 466 A.2d 1324 (Law Div. 1983).

1989]

NOTE

259

the scene of an accident.9 9 The police then brought the defendant to the hospital, where he was administered two blood tests
revealing blood alcohol percentages of 0.153 and 0.155.10

The defendant attacked his conviction contending that there
existed no proof that he operated his vehicle "while under the
influence of alcohol."'' 1 Affirming the defendant's conviction,
the court nevertheless held that for a defendant to violate N.J.
Stat. Ann. § 39:4-50, he or she must operate his or her automobile while under the influence of alcohol. ' 0 2 The court reasoned
that the intent behind the statute is clear: "the act of operating a
vehicle must be contemporaneous with being under the
03
influence."

Early decisions consistently permitted the use of extrapolation evidence to assert a lower blood alcohol level at the time of
driving, yet dismissed assertions that the prosecution was not
meeting its burden of proof. 10 4 In State v. Miller'o5 the defendant
was administered two breathalyzer tests approximately thirty
minutes after his arrest. 10 6 The results of the tests exhibited a
0.11% and 0.12% blood alcohol concentration. 10 7 An expert testified for the defendant contending that in light of the amount of
alcohol the defendant had consumed, the defendant's blood alcohol reading would have been 0.09% at the time of his arrest.' 0 8
99 Id. at 390, 466 A.2d at 1325.
100 Id. at 391, 466 A.2d at 1325-26.
101 Id. at 393, 466 A.2d at 1326 (emphasis in original). The defendant also ap-

pealed on the ground that the method used to withdraw the blood sample was in
error. Id. at 391, 466 A.2d at 1326. The defendant contended that those who withdrew the blood should testify, because that was the only way the state could establish that the manner and environment in which the blood was taken was acceptable.
Id. The court dismissed the argument. Id. at 392, 466 A.2d at 1326.
102 Id. at 393, 466 A.2d at 1326-27.
103 Id., 466 A.2d at 1326 (citing State v. Prociuk, 145 N.J. Super. 570, 368 A.2d
436 (Law Div. 1976)). The court found, however, that other evidence established
the case, such as, the fact that the defendant "reeked" of alcohol, staggered, and
admitted to operating the vehicle. Id., 466 A.2d at 1327.
104 See, e.g.,
State v. Miller, 220 N.J. Super. 106, 531 A.2d 742 (App. Div. 1985);
State v. O'Connor, 220 N.J. Super. 104, 531 A.2d 741 (App. Div. 1984). See State v.
Tischio, 107 N.J. 504, 527 A.2d 388 (1987), appeal dismissed, 108 S. Ct. 768 (1988).
In his dissenting opinion in Tischio, Justice Clifford stated that those states with
statutes similar to New Jersey's have "uniformly rejected" the interpretation of the
Tischio majority. Id. at 532, 527 A.2d at 402 (Clifford, J. dissenting). See also Cheever & Bird, supra note 5, at 3 (stating that New Jersey is now the only state prohibiting the use of extrapolation evidence in prosecutions for driving while intoxicated).
105 220 N.J. Super. 106, 531 A.2d 742 (App. Div. 1985).
106 Id. at 107, 531 A.2d at 742-43.
107 Id.
108 Id. at 108, 531 A.2d at 743. See also Cheever & Bird, supra note 5, at 25 (noting
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In reversing the defendant's conviction, the court found that
the expert testimony precluded a finding of "guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." 109 In making this determination,, the court
noted, as did the court in D'Agostino, that N.J. Stat. Ann. § 39:450 prohibits driving with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.10%
or more." 0 Thus, the court returned to the earlier pragmatic
and literal interpretation of the state's drunken-driving statute
and failed to separate the offense from the actual driving of the
automobile. "'
Similarly, the court in State v. Ghegan" 2 interpreted N.J. Stat.
Ann. § 39:4-50 as creating only a prima facie case of intoxication
upon a breathalyzer reading in violation of the statute.' 13 In reversing the defendant's conviction, the court found error in the
law division's determination that Kreyer imposed "strict liability"
on one who operates a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.10% or more. 1 4 Instead, the majority found that
15
the state drunken-driving statute prescribed no such duty.'
Furthermore, the court stated that the correct interpretation was
limited to a finding that a violative blood alcohol ratio provided
the state with a prima facie case." 16 This, the court continued, is
without consideration of whether the individual is impaired or
able to operate his or her vehicle." 7
This course of interpretation was continued after both
Ghegan and the appellate division's decision in Tischio."s In State
v. Allen," 9 the defendant was arrested and charged with driving
while intoxicated. 120 The results of two breathalyzer tests were
that extrapolation evidence is the defense strategy in about 90% of drunken-driving cases).
109 Miller, 220 N.J. Super. at 109, 531 A.2d at 743.
110 Id. at 108, 531 A.2d at 743 (emphasis added). In D'Agostino, the court stated
that N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:4-50 "proscribes... driving a motor vehicle with a blood
alcohol concentration of 0.10% or more." D'Agostino, 203 N.J. Super. at 71, 495
A.2d at 916.
111 Miller, 220 N.J. Super. at 109, 531 A.2d at 743.
112 213 N.J. Super. 383, 517 A.2d 490 (App. Div. 1986).
113 Id. at 385, 517 A.2d at 491.
114 See id. at 384-85, 517 A.2d at 491. Specifically, the court stated, "Kreyer does
not mandate that a 0.10% blood alcohol reading is irrebuttable." Id.
115 See id. at 385, 517 A.2d at 491.
116 Id.
117 Id.

118 State v. Tischio, 208 N.J. Super. 343, 506 A.2d 14 (App. Div. 1986), aff'd, 107
N.J. 504, 527 A.2d 388 (1987), appeal dismissed, 108 S. Ct. 768 (1988).
119 212 N.J. Super. 276, 514 A.2d 879 (Law Div. 1986), certif. denied, 107 N.J. 630,
527 A.2d 454 (1987).
120 Allen, 212 N.J. Super. at 277, 514 A.2d at 879.
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readings of 0.13% and 0.14%.2 The defendant sought to introduce expert testimony to support his claim that at the time he
was driving, his blood alcohol concentration was at a statutorily
22
permissible level. 1
In making its determination regarding the admissibility of
such testimony, the court noted that the defendant would be subject to the appellate division's decision in Tischio.' 23 Despite this
earlier case, the court permitted the introduction of the extrapolation evidence. 2 4 The Allen court interpreted Tischio to free the
state from an obligation to produce such evidence in order to
sustain its burden of proof but not to preclude a defendant's production of such testimony. 12 5 The court concluded that a con12 6
trary opinion could only result from a misreading of the case.
In its analysis, the Allen majority stated that the only issue
raised by the defendant in Tischio was the degree of the state's
burden of proof.1 27 The court concluded that it was not the obligation of the state to extrapolate the breathalyzer evidence to establish the defendant's blood alcohol concentration at the time of
driving. 2 8 Furthermore, the court noted that the "time bomb"
discussion in Tischio was merely dicta, and therefore, not controlling. 12 9 The court then elaborated that the legislative scheme
and history of N.J. Stat. Ann. § 39:4-50 weighed heavily against
the Tischio dicta.130 The court determined that the entire focus of
Id.
Id.
Id. The appellate division in Tischio deemed extrapolation evidence unnecessary so long as there had been no ingestion of alcohol between the time of driving
and the time of testing. State v. Tischio, 208 N.J. Super. 343, 347, 506 A.2d 14, 16
(App. Div. 1986), aff'd, 107 N.J. 504, 527 A.2d 388 (1987), appeal dismissed, 108 S.
Ct. 768 (1988).
124 Allen, 212 N.J. Super. at 283, 514 A.2d at 883.
121
122
123

125 See id.

See id. at 278, 514 A.2d at 880.
Id. at 279, 514 A.2d at 880.
Id.
Id. The appellate court in Tischio stated that extrapolation of evidence produces an anomalous result. State v. Tischio, 208 N.J. Super. 343, 347, 506 A.2d 14,
16 (App. Div. 1986), aff'd, 107 N.J. 504, 527 A.2d 388 (1987), appeal dismissed, 108 S.
Ct. 768 (1988). Noting that the ingestion of alcohol causes the blood alcohol ratio
to increase, the court declared that those who have ingested enough alcohol sit as
-moving time bombs." Id.
130 Allen, 212 N.J. Super. at 281, 514 A.2d at 881-82. The court noted that prior
to the statute's 1983 amendment, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:4-50.1 created a presumption of intoxication "[i]f there was at that time [a blood alcohol concentration of]
0.10%," thus referring to the time of operation. Allen, 212 N.J. Super. at 281, 514
A.2d at 882 (emphasis in original). Additionally, the preamble to the statute, presently reads, "[iun any prosecution . . . relating to driving a vehicle while under the
126
127
128
129
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New Jersey's drunken-driving law is on the time of driving. 31
In State v. Tischio,' 3 2 however, the NewJersey Supreme Court
rejected the Allen court's analysis. In his consideration of the appellate division's decision in Tischio, Justice Handler was faced
with determining at what point breathalyzer readings become relevant. 13 3 The supreme court maintained that N.J. Stat. Ann.
§ 39:4-50 requires a breathalyzer 34to be given within a reasonable
time following actual operation.

The Tischio majority began its analysis with a consideration
of the literal interpretation of N.J. Stat. Ann. § 39:4-50. 3 5 The
statute, the majority explained, involved two elements: the prohibited blood alcohol concentration and the operation of a vehicle. 136 Concluding that a literal reading dictates that both
elements occur together, the court nevertheless stated that such
a reading is contrary to public policy and would frustrate the surrounding legislative intent. 3 7 To corroborate this conclusion,
the court indicated that the statute specifically contemplates the
38
use of a breathalyzer test to determine blood alcohol content.
Since the test could never coincide with the actual time of driving, the court held that the statute either contemplated that the
breathalyzer results alone were satisfactory or that further evidence was necessary to relate these findings back to the time of
influence." Id. (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:4-50.1 (West Supp. 1985) (emphasis
in original)). Also, the court noted that the present reading of N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 39:4-50.1 paragraphs one and two both contain the words "at that time," referring again to the time of driving. Id. (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:50.1 (West
Supp. 1985)). The court also pointed to the "straightforward language" of N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 39:4-50(a) looking not to the time of testing, but rather to the time of
driving. Allen, 212 N.J. Super. at 282, 514 A.2d at 882. The Allen court stated that if
the time of testing was to become "all-important" the following questions would be
raised: "How much discretion should police have in this regard? What is the right
of an accused to a speedy test, or the opposite?. Can the police give successive tests
until a 0.10% reading is obtained? What due process questions are raised?" Id. at
283, 514 A.2d at 883.
13 Id. at 282, 514 A.2d at 882.
132 107 N.J. 504, 522, 527 A.2d 388, 397 (1987), appeal dismissed, 108 S.Ct. 768
(1988).
133 Tischio, 107 N.J. at 504, 527 A.2d at 388.
134 Id.
135 Id. at 509, 527 A.2d at 390.
136 Id.
137 See id. Additional considerations enumerated by the court which weighed
against such a reading included the fact that the statute was ambiguous and that a
literal reading was contrary to the overall legislative scheme of New Jersey's
drunken-driving law. Id.
138 Id. at 510, 527 A.2d at 390-91.
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driving. 13 9
To make such a determination, the majority declared that
40
the surrounding legislative intent must be ascertained.'
Notwithstanding the statute's penal nature,' 4 ' the court found
that the legislative intent indicated "special objectives" requiring
a flexible interpretation of the drunken-driving statute. 42 Based
upon these considerations, the court concluded that the purpose
behind the statute was to cure the ills spread by the drunken
driver 143 and thus held that a flexible and pragmatic approach
was mandated. 144

The majority identified that the underlying goal of the statute was to eliminate the drunken driver from the state's roadways.' 45 The court found that to effectuate this goal, both the
courts and legislature have run a consistent course toward mini46
mizing the need for expert testimony at drunken-driving trials. 1
To support this contention the majority cited the statute's history, beginning with the 1presumption
of intoxication first created
47
by the 1951 legislature.

The court explained that in 1951, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 39:4-50
was amended to include a presumption of intoxication upon the
finding of a blood alcohol level of 0.15%. 148 The majority noted
139 Id., 527 A.2d at 391. The majority stated, "[i]t is settled that the most important factor in construing a statute is the intent of the legislature." Id. (citing Perez
v. Pantasote, Inc., 95 N.J. 105, 114, 469 A.2d 22, 27 (1984)).
140 See id. at 510-11, 527 A.2d at 391.
141 Id. at 511, 527 A.2d at 391. The court recognized that a penal statute should
be construed strictly. Id. (citing State v. Grant, 196 N.J. Super. 470, 480-81, 483
A.2d 411, 417 (App. Div. 1984)). The court also noted, however, that even with a
case involving a criminal statute, the goal is to determine the legislative intent. Id.
(quoting State v. Provenzano, 34 N.J. 318, 322, 169 A.2d 135, 137-38 (1961)).
Thus, the court concluded they are to be given a meaning which is consistent with
the obvious intention and the law's purpose. Id. (quoting State v. Brown, 22 N.J.
405, 415, 126 A.2d 161, 166 (1956)).
142 Id. at 512, 527 A.2d at 392.
143 Id.
144 Id. The majority explained further that they were never hesitant to apply such
a broad approach if to do otherwise would frustrate the legislative intent. Id. at
513, 527 A.2d at 392. To illustrate this point, the court cited a number of cases
which gave a broad meaning to the word operation as used in the statute. Id. at
513-14, 527 A.2d at 392-93 (citing State v. Mulcahy, 107 N.J. 467, 527 A.2d 368
(1987) (defendant sitting in car about to put the keys into the ignition operated
vehicle for purposes of N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:4-50); State v. Sweeney, 40 N.J. 359,
192 A.2d 573 (1963) (holding that operation does not require movement of a
vehicle)).
145 Id. at 514, 527 A.2d at 393.
146 Id.
147 Id. at 515, 527 A.2d at 393.
148 Id.
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that although this statute did not altogether dispense with the
149
need for expert testimony, it remained its main objective.
This, the Tischio majority analyzed, in conjunction with the 1983
amendment, clearly expressed an intention to rely on
breathalyzer
results in the development of this area of New Jersey
0
law.

15

The majority observed that in determining blood alcohol
levels, courts have consistently sought to alleviate the need for
expert testimony.' 5 ' Additionally, the majority elaborated that
the scheme of the state's drunken-driving law indicates that the
51 2
admission of extrapolation evidence was not contemplated.'
Moreover, the court maintained that the constant minimization
of the need for such evidence dictated a finding that such evidence frustrates the legal scheme of drunken-driving law in New
Jersey.

153

In support of its opinion, the majority next addressed the
evolution of the present statute. 154 The court recognized that
the statute, as originally proposed, dictated that a finding of a
0.10% blood alcohol ratio within four hours after driving constituted the offense.' 55 The majority dismissed the defendant's argument that the proposal was indicative of a legislative intent to
look to the actual time of driving.' 56 Justice Handler observed
that the deletion of the four-hour period supports the exclusion
of extrapolation evidence. 157 Thus, the majority held that the
statute calls for a breathalyzer test to be administered "within a
id.
Id. at 516, 527 A.2d at 394. Section 39:4-50(a) after the 1983 amendment and
as currently enacted states, in pertinent part, that "[a] person who operates a motor
vehicle . . .with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.10% or more by weight of
alcohol in the defendant's blood ...shall be subject [to the penalties listed]." N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 39:4-50(a) (West Supp. 1988).
151 Tischio, 107 N.J. at 517, 527 A.2d at 394-95 (citing State v. Johnson, 42 N.J.
146, 199 A.2d 809 (1964)).
152 Id. at 518, 527 A.2d at 395.
149 See
150

153

Id.

154

Id.

155 Id. The original proposal provided:

A person charged under.., this section whose blood alcohol concentration is 0.10% or more by weight as shown by a chemical analysis of a
blood, breath, urine or other bodily substance sample taken within four
hours of the alleged offense shall be guilty of [operating a motor vehicle
while under the influence of intoxicating liquor].
Id.
156
157

Id. at 518-19, 527 A.2d at 395.
Id. at 519, 527 A.2d at 396.
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reasonable time" after operation.15 8

Lastly, the majority justified its holding by stating that public
policy considerations support such an interpretation. 159 The
court declared that those who drive with a blood alcohol ratio of
0.10% or more threaten not only themselves, but all those who
use New Jersey roads. 160 The court further observed that prosecution of these drivers should not depend solely upon the time
16 1
and circumstances in which they are stopped by the police.
Borrowing the appellate division's "time-bomb" analogy, the
court reasoned that the law should not encourage the drunken
driver to race quickly home1 62
before his or her blood alcohol level
reaches a prohibitive peak.
Finding unpersuasive the defendant's contention that those
apprehended prior to reaching the prohibited 0.10% blood alcohol level could still be prosecuted under N.J. Stat. Ann. § 39:450(a), the majority ruled that such an argument ignores the legislature's reliance on the breathalyzer test.' 63 Undoubtedly, the
court found, that a person who has consumed a prohibited
amount of alcohol may not possess sufficient symptoms to permit
a finding of intoxication." 64 The essential point, in the court's
opinion, was that "somewhere 'down the road' disaster may
result."1

65

The Tischio majority found equally unpersuasive the defend158 Id. But see Cheever & Bird, supra note 5, at 25. The article states that the cosponsor of the amendment disagrees with the court's reading. Id. The article
noted:
But the co-sponsor of the 1983 amendment disagrees with the
[c]ourt's interpretation and says the lawmakers' primary concern was the
time of operation of the vehicle, not the time of the breath test. "I don't
think anyone foresaw where such extrapolation testimony would be irrelevant and inadmissible," says Assembly Minority Leader Alan J.
Karcher.
Id.
159 Tischio, 107 N.J. at 519, 527 A.2d at 396.
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 Id. at 519-20, 527 A.2d at 396 (quoting State v. Tischio, 208 N.J. Super. 343,
347, 506 A.2d 14, 16 (App. Div. 1986), aff'd, 107 N.J. 504, 527 A.2d 388 (1987),
appeal dismissed, 108 S. Ct. 768 (1988)). The appellate division likened the driver
who has not fully ingested the alcohol consumed to a moving time bomb. State v.
Tischio, 208 N.J. Super. 343, 347, 506 A.2d 14, 16 (1986), aff'd, 107 N.J. 504, 527
A.2d 388 (1987), appeal dismissed, 108 S.Ct. 768 (1988).
163 Tischio, 107 N.J. at 520, 527 A.2d at 396. The defendant asserted that the
individual could still be prosecuted for driving while under the influence of alcohol.
Id.
164 See id. at 520-21, 527 A.2d at 396.
165 Id. at 521, 527 A.2d at 396.
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ant's contention that a person who has arrived home safely can
still be convicted, even if at home for an hour. 1 66 The court rejected this argument finding it to be "far-fetched."' 1 6 7 Additionally, the majority dismissed the defendant's assertion that the
court's finding would encourage repeated testing until the prohibited reading is obtained. ' 68 This possibility, the court stated,
was prevented by requiring the test to be administered "within a
16 9
reasonable time after arrest."'
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Clifford accused the majority of undertaking a legislative role and enacting "wholesome social policy."' 70 Reminding the majority of its appropriate judicial
function, Justice Clifford stated that the majority's view would
have been given his support had they been members of the legislature. 17 1 Moreover, the justice asserted that the majority opinion stepped away from interpretation and moved closer to
creation. 1 72 Justice Clifford criticized the majority for taking liberties with legislative history and for dismissing the opinion of
the state's attorney general. 17 3 He maintained that ajust reading
of the statute indicated that "the critical time for determining" a
drunken-driving offense is the time in which a defendant oper74
ates a vehicle.'
Agreeing with a portion of the appellate division's holding,
the dissent stated that it is not the burden of the state to relate
the breathalyzer tests back to the time of driving. 1 75 Justice Clif166
167

Id., 527 A.2d at 396-97.
Id., 527 A.2d at 397.

168

Id.

Id.
See id. at 522, 527 A.2d at 397 (Clifford, J., dissenting). Justice Clifford, in his
dissent, explained that law enforcement geared against the drunken driver, "ranks
only slightly behind the veneration of motherhood and probably slightly ahead of a
robust hankering after apple pie in the hierarchy of values firmly embedded in our
culture." Id.
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 Id. at 523, 527 A.2d at 397-98 (Clifford,J., dissenting). The Attorney General
argued that it should not be the burden of the state to extrapolate evidence to the
time of driving, yet conceded that the efficacy of breathalyzer results can be defeated by the use of extrapolation evidence. Id. at 532-33, 527 A.2d at 403 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
174 Id. at 523, 527 A.2d at 397 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
175 Id. at 524, 527 A.2d at 398 (Clifford, J., dissenting). At the appellate level,
both parties conceded that extrapolation of evidence was probative and argued instead the issue of who had the burden of extrapolating evidence to prove the defendant's blood alcohol level at the time of driving. State v. Tischio, 208 N.J.
Super. 343, 506 A.2d 14 (1986), aff'd, 107 N.J. 504, 527 A.2d 388 (1987), appeal
dismissed, 108 S. Ct. 768 (1988)).
169
170
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ford viewed the problem to lie in the lower court's proposal that
the breathalyzer test alone, given at any time, sufficed to establish
the offense. 176 Justice Clifford declared that the opinion failed to
1 77
define exactly what constitutes the offense.
Justice Clifford maintained that the majority, in denying the
probative value of extrapolation evidence, deemed the offense to
be committed when the breathalyzer test yielded a violative
blood alcohol count. 178 Recognizing that criminal statutes must
be strictly construed, the justice posited that the offense is the
operation of a motor vehicle by a driver with a blood alcohol level
in excess of the statutorily permissible limit.' 79 Furthermore,

Justice Clifford charged that the statute is neither unclear nor
ambiguous and that it plainly prescribes the offense. 180
Justice Clifford noted that the majority's decision is not a reaction to, as they maintain, the statute's ambiguity, but rather a
reflection of their concern that a literal reading makes enforcement difficult.' 8' The justice maintained that this need not be
so. 18 2 Instead, he suggested that the 0.10% breathalyzer result

serve as prima facie evidence of drunken-driving so long as the
test is given within a reasonable time after arrest.' 8 3 As a consequence, the dissent argued that extrapolation evidence in contradiction of test results should be permitted. 184 Justice Clifford
explained that any other ruling denies that the offense is indeed
operating a vehicle
with the prohibited blood alcohol
5
concentration.18

Stating that what the legislature contemplated is clear, the
dissent next outlined the language of the statute in order to support its contentions.186 Noting that a statute is to be viewed as a
whole, Justice Clifford pointed to the pre-1983 statute which described the offense as driving a vehicle while under the influence of
alcohol.'1 7 Additionally, Justice Clifford reasoned that the three
Tischio, 107 N.J. at 524, 527 A.2d at 398 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
Id. at 525, 527 A.2d 398-99 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
Id., 527 A.2d at 399 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
179 Id. (emphasis in original) (citing State v. Maguire, 84 N.J. 508, 514, 423 A.2d
294, 297 (1980); State v. Grant, 196 N.J. Super. 470, 480-81, 483 A.2d 411, 417
(App. Div. 1984)).
180 Id. at 526, 527 A.2d at 399 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
18, See id.
182 Id.
183 Id.
184 See id.
185 See id. at 527-28, 527 A.2d at 400 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
176
177
178

186
187

Id. (citing N.J.

STAT. ANN.

§ 39:4-50.1 (West 1973)).

Id. at 528, 527 A.2d at 400 (Clifford, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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subsections of N.J. Stat. Ann. § 39:4-50.1 prior to 1983 clearly
referred to the time of operation.' 8 8 Noting the 1983 deletion of
subsection three, Justice Clifford nevertheless maintained that
there was no indication of a legislative intent to shift the focus to
the time of testing. 8 9 In contrast, the justice elaborated that the
entire statute is directed toward a defendant who operates a motor vehicle.' 90 Justice Clifford stated that the majority's view
would produce an anomalous result. 1 ' With subsections one
and two of the 1983 statute still in effect, Justice Clifford concluded that the majority's opinion would result in one part of the
statute referring to the time of driving and another to the time of
testing.192 This result, the justice declared, is contrary to the

general rule "that a word or phrase should have the same meanstatute in the absence of a clear indication to
ing throughout9 the
3
the contrary." 1

Furthermore, Justice Clifford relied on the statute's legislative history in support of his position.' 9 4 The justice noted that
the Assembly Committee Statement which was attached to the
1983 amendment contained nothing in regard to the pivotal time
of the offense.' 95 Thus, the dissent inferred that the legislature,
in absence of statements to the contrary, intended the time of
driving to remain critical. 196 Justice Clifford referred to the fact
that as originally proposed, the amendment contained a provision which stated that a person violated the state's drunkendriving statute if a breathalyzer test given within four hours after
driving revealed a prohibited blood alcohol concentration. 197
Such a statute, he continued, would have embraced the majority's
conclusions but the legislature specifically resisted such a
result. 198

In conclusion, Justice Clifford conjured no support for the
majority's position.' 99 Rather, the justice held that consistent
188 Id.
189

Id.

190 Id.
191 See id. at 528-29, 527 A.2d at 400-01 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
192 Id. at 529, 527 A.2d at 401 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
193 Id. at 529-30, 527 A.2d at 401 (Clifford,J., dissenting) (quoting Perez v. Pantasote, Inc., 95 N.J. 105, 116, 469 A.2d 22, 28 (1984)).
194 See id.
195 Id.
196

Id.

197 Id.

198 See id. at 530, 527 A.2d at 401 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
199 Id. at 532-33, 527 A.2d at 403 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
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with the Attorney General's view, test results given within a reasonable time produce prima facie evidence of the offense.20 0 Additionally, the justice contended that a defendant should be
permitted to produce extrapolation evidence as to his or her
20
blood alcohol ratio at the time of driving. '
Perhaps the impact of the Tischio decision is greatest when
viewed together with the sweeping changes in the state's
drunken-driving law, beginning with the 1951 creation of a presumption of intoxication. 20 2 Alone, each step in the process appears reasonably related to achieving a legitimate state end.
Together, these changes effectively not only remove the state's
burden of proof in a penal matter, but deprive the defendant of
the right to defend himself or herself in regard to the offense.20 3
Tischio is the end of a road upon which the lawmakers and interpreters have moved in their zeal to respond to the outcry of condemnation caused by the scourge of the drunken driver.
Particularly troubling is that in the process the distinction
between the lawmakers and the law interpreters became somewhat murky. The Tischio court did not adequately support its
contention that the statute was neither plain nor unambiguous.
To say, as they did, that the surrounding circumstances make the
statute ambiguous does not bypass the fact that the wording itself
is indeed clear-clearly forbidding operation with the prohibited
blood alcohol ratio. It appears that the Tischio court had a particular result in mind and crafted the law to reach this end.
As noted in both the Tischio dissent 20 4 and the Allen decision, 205 NJ. Stat. Ann. § 39:4-50 has, in the past, pointed to the
time of operation as the critical time-frame for drunken driving of200
201

Id.
Id. at 533, 527 A.2d at 403 (Clifford, J., dissenting). Justice Clifford also de-

manded respect for the state's chief law enforcement officer who conceded that

extrapolation evidence could rebut the state's prima facie case. Id.
202 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-50.1 (West 1954) (creating a presumption of intoxi-

cation upon a finding of a blood alcohol ratio of 0.15%); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:450.1 (West Supp. 1978) (raising the presumption to 0.10%); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 39:4-50 (West Supp. 1985) (making the operation of a vehicle with a 0.10% blood
alcohol level an offense in itself.
203 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:1-13 (West 1982) declaring, "[n]o person may be convicted of an offense unless each element of such offense is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In the absence of such proof, the innocence of the defendant is
assumed." Id.

204 See Tischio, 107 N.J. at 522-33, 527 A.2d at 397-403 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
205 State v. Allen, 212 N.J. Super. 276, 514 A.2d 879 (Law Div. 1986) certif denied,
107 N.J. 630, 527 A.2d 454 (1987).
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fenses. 2 ° 6 In its present form, all other areas of the statute refer
to the time of operation in defining the particular offense.20 7
Thus, the majority creates an exception within the statute that
focuses the offense of driving with a blood alcohol level of 0.10%
at the time of testing. This result is somewhat illogical. Additionally, it refutes the basic premise that a statute's provision should
20 8
be construed with reference to the whole.
Equally confusing is the majority's reliance on New Jersey
precedent. The Tischio majority failed to note its deviation from
prior case law on drunken driving. Instead, the court claimed
that prior law supported its decision when in fact, Tischio is the
first case in New Jersey to totally deny the probative value of extrapolation evidence in drunken-driving cases. The majority frequently used dicta of earlier cases to bolster its position 20 9 but
failed to state that these same courts consistently ruled that extrapolation evidence remained probative.
The court also chose to leave open questions raised by its
holding. In its zest to rule that the time of testing is the crucial
point, the majority failed to make an attempt to define what a
"reasonable" time is. The Tischio holding tosses out a vague concept but fails to support this idea with clear guidelines. Similarly,
the court failed to state whether repeated testing in search of a
prohibited blood alcohol level is permissible or if the method of
testing must also be reasonable.
As a consequence, the rights of the defendants in drunkendriving cases appear to have become subordinated to the cause
of eliminating the intoxicated driver from the state's roadways.
The Tischio court sidesteps the fact that drunken driving is a crim206 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:4-50.1 (West 1973) (stating that each presumption
arises at that time, referring to operation of the vehicle).
207 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:4-50.1 (West 1973) (describing time of operation as
dispositive); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:4-50(a) (West Supp. 1988) (referring to the time
of operation as determinative).
208 See, e.g., State v. Brown, 22 N.J. 405, 126 A.2d 161 (1956). The court in
Brown explained that:
[Tihe sense of a law is to be gathered from its object and the nature of
the subject matter, the contextual setting, and the statutes in pari
materia.... A statute is to be construed as a whole with reference to the
system of which it is a part.... This principle is essential to give unity to
the laws, and to connect them in a symmetrical system ....
The import
of any word or phrase is to be gleaned from the context and statutes in
pari materia.
Id. at 415, 126 A.2d at 166 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
209 Tischio, 107 N.J. at 512, 527 A.2d at 392 (citing State v. D'Agostino, 203 N.J.
Super. 69, 72, 495 A.2d 915, 917 (Law Div. 1984)).
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inal offense 1 ' and effectively strips the accused drunken driver of
rights afforded to an accused murderer. The end result is that in
New Jersey
there are no longer defenses to the crime of drunken
21
driving. '
It must be noted that the goal the court sought to attain is a
noble one. Yet, in our system, there can be no exchanges. We
cannot forfeit the constitutional rights of the individual to
achieve a legitimate goal. Nor can a statute be misconstrued to
support this noble end. Instead the system confines the courts to
the boundaries created by prior case law and legislative enactments. Thus, as a result of the Tischio decision, our safer roadways may have been paved with the rubble of individual liberties.
Marybeth Scriven
210

See N.J.

STAT. ANN.

§ 39:4-50 (West Supp. 1988) which states in pertinent

part:
A person who operates a motor vehicle while under the influence of
intoxicating liquor .... or operates a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol
concentration of 0.10% or more by weight of alcohol in the defendant's
blood . . . shall be subject:
(1) For the first offense, to a fine of not less than $250.00 nor more
than $400.00 and a period of detainment of not less than 12 hours nor
more than 48 hours spent during two consecutive days .

.

. a term of

imprisonment of not more than 30 days and shall forthwith forfeit his
right to operate a motor vehicle over the highways of this [s]tate for a
period of not less than six months nor more than one year.
Id. See also Tischio, 107 N.J. at 511, 527 A.2d at 391 (noting the penal nature of the
statute).
211 See Cheever & Bird, supra note 5, at 5 (stating that Tischio deprives defendants
of the defense strategy used in 90%6 of drunken-driving cases).

